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We show that in the Uzawa-Lucas model with externality in human capital with agents that value 
both consumption and leisure, the government pursuing the first best can achieve its goal by 
subsidizing the foregone earnings while studying. The subsidy should be financed by a schooling 
fee.  We  obtain  that  countries  with  similar  initial  conditions  may  issue  different  fees  because 
multiple equilibria can arise for empirically plausible values of parameters. This result differs 
from the one obtained in ananalogous economy where agents only value consumption. 
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Human capital growth expands future possibilities. Hence the importance of its accu-
mulation for the human development and economic growth. Building on Uzawa (1965)
and Lucas (1988), a lot of research has been devoted to the study of the dynamics of two
sector models with agents that have to decide on the optimal allocation of human capital
across the production and education sectors.1
One of the most widely studied extensions of the Uzawa framework was introduced
by Lucas (1988) and assumes human capital externalities in the production of goods:
the average human capital stock increases total factor productivity, but this is not taken
into account by individual agents when making economic decisions. It is a well known
result that in such a model the competitive equilibrium does not coincide with the social
optimum. In the absence of public intervention, time devoted to accumulate human
capital and the growth rate at the steady state are too low. However, there may exist
policies that allow to decentralize the ￿rst best outcome.
Several papers have addressed this question in theoretical setups where the utility is
derived only from consumption. For example, Bethmann (2007) develops a closed form
solution and shows that the optimal allocation is reached by taxing labor income and
subsidizing capital income. Garc￿a-Castrillo and Sanso (2000) prove that the ￿rst best
could be reached under a direct subsidy of the time devoted to education funded through
a lump-sum tax and a tax on human capital income. In a similar model, G￿mez (2003)
shows that lump sum taxation can be avoided and that the optimal solution can be
achieved by taxing labor income and subsidizing the investment into human capital.
In this paper we extend the model economy in G￿mez (2003) with agents that value
both consumption and leisure. Our analysis considers subsidies that depend on foregone
income while studying which might be funded with revenues obtained by taxing labor
and capital incomes, and through lump sum taxes. We show that when agents face
labor-leisure choice, the combinations of taxes and subsidies that decentralize the social
optimum are di⁄erent from the ones discussed above. In particular, lump sum taxation
has to be included in the design of the optimal policy and labor and capital income taxes
should be set equal to zero. We perform our analysis in a representative agent in￿nite
horizon model with general utility and production functions. Nevertheless, a discrete
version of the model allows us to present an analytical solution for a certain combination
1Just to mention for example CaballØ and Santos (1993), Chamley (1993), Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin
(1993), Benhabib and Perli (1994), Garc￿a-Castrillo and Sanso (2000), Ben-Gad (2003), G￿mez (2003),
G￿mez (2004), Bethmann (2007), among many others.
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4of functional forms for the utility and production technology.
Finally, some papers in this literature have studied the model assumptions under which
the balanced growth path is unique and fully determined. Benhabib and Perli (1994)
discuss the multiplicity of equilibria and transitional paths in the Uzawa-Lucas model with
externality in human capital. They show that if the externality is high, there always exists
a continuum of equilibria. Under some conditions the balanced growth path can become
indeterminate, too. Ladr￿n-de-Guevara et al. (1997 and 1999) consider a model without
externalities and show that by including leisure in the utility function multiple balanced
growth paths arise. The fact that indeterminacy may arise in our setup implies that
two di⁄erent economies that face similar initial conditions may choose di⁄erent optimal
allocations for working, leisure time and consumption. Therefore, optimal subsidies to
foregone earnings and schooling fees may di⁄er in these economies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model and its main properties
for the competitive and social planner equilibria are stated in section 2. The optimal policy
in derived in section 3. Final conclusions are summarized in section 4.
2 The Model Economy
We consider a model economy that extends Uzawa (1965) and Lucas (1988) to include
leisure-labor decisions. There are two production sectors: the ￿nal good sector and the
education sector that produces new human capital. The economy is populated by identical
and in￿nitely lived agents. Total population is assumed to be constant and normalized
to one. Households have initial endowments of physical and human capital, k0 and h0;
respectively. Agents also have an endowment of one unit of time at each period t that
they allocate to the production of the ￿nal good, ut, leisure activities, lt, or human capital
accumulation, 1 ￿ ut ￿ lt.
2.1 Final Good Sector
The ￿nal good sector produces a commodity that can be consumed or accumulated as
physical capital. The technology in this sector combines physical capital, kt, and e¢ ciency




where hat is the average human capital stock and the term h￿
at captures the exter-
nal e⁄ect of average human capital in the production of goods. Finally, F(kt;Lt) is
3
5homogeneous of degree one, concave, increasing and such that limkt!0 Fk(kt;Lt) = 0;
limLt!0 FL(kt;Lt) = 0; and F(0;Lt) = F(kt;0) = 0: Note that parameter ￿ measures the
degree of the externality and also the degree of increasing returns to scale at the social
level.
Firms maximize pro￿ts taking prices and the average stock of human capital as given.
Inputs￿demands are such that




wt = FL (kt;utht)h
￿
at (3)
where rt is the return on capital, ￿k is the rate at which the physical capital depreciates
and wt is the wage per e¢ ciency unit of labor.
2.2 Education Sector
The schooling sector produces human capital services. Human capital accumulation de-
pends on the time spent studying 1￿ut￿lt and on the level of human capital ht according
to
ht+1 = ￿(1 ￿ ut ￿ lt)ht + (1 ￿ ￿h)ht (4)
where ￿ is a measure of productivity in the education sector and ￿h is the depreciation
rate of human capital.
2.3 Households
Households derive utility from consumption, ct, and leisure, lt. Lifetime welfare is char-





where ￿ is the discount factor. The function U(￿;￿) is increasing, strictly concave, twice
continuously di⁄erentiable and additively separable in both arguments.
Households pay proportional labor income taxes at rate ￿wt and capital income taxes
at rate ￿rt. The government subsidizes the investment in human capital funding a fraction
st of wage income that is foregone while studying. Finally, the model also considers a
lump sum tax or subsidy Tt. The budget constraint that agents face at t can be written
as
ct + kt+1 ￿ kt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿rt)rtkt + (1 ￿ ￿wt)wthtut ￿ Tt + stwt (1 ￿ ut ￿ lt)ht: (6)
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6The problem of the representative agent is to maximize the lifetime utility (5), subject
to the budget constraint (6), and the condition for the accumulation of human capital (4)
and taking as given prices, policies and initial values for physical and human capital. Let
￿t and "t be the non-negative Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget constraint
(6) and the condition for the accumulation of human capital (4), respectively. The ￿rst
order necessary conditions on consumption, labor, leisure, physical and human capital,
respectively, are
Uc (ct;lt) = ￿t; (7)
￿t (1 ￿ ￿wt ￿ st)wtht = ￿"tht; (8)












wt+1ut+1 + st+1wt+1 (1 ￿ ut+1 ￿ lt+1)
￿
+




t￿tkt+1 = 0; (12)
lim
t!1￿
t"tht+1 = 0: (13)
The Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget constraint and the constraint
on human capital accumulation, ￿t and "t; can be interpreted as the marginal utility of
wealth and the shadow price of human capital, respectively. The ￿rst order condition on
consumption (7) indicates the marginal utility of wealth. The ￿rst order conditions on
working and leisure time, (8) and (9), determine the optimal allocation of time among
the three activities, working, studying and leisure. The ￿rst order conditions on physical
capital (10) and human capital (11) embody the costs and pro￿ts associated with investing
one marginal unit of wealth in either capital.
Plugging (7) and (8) into (9) and (10), we can easily get the usual intertemporal and
5
7intratemporal ￿rst order conditions









Ul (ct;lt) = Uc (ct;lt)(1 ￿ ￿wt)wtht: (15)
Note that the capital income tax distorts intertemporal consumption decisions and the
labor income tax distorts consumption-leisure decisions.
2.4 Government
Fiscal policy targets human capital accumulation. The government taxes capital and labor
income and subsidizes the investment in human capital. Wages lost while studying are
subsidized by a ￿ at rate. Any missing (remaining) income is taken from (transferred back
to) the consumers in the form of lump-sum tax (subsidy) in order to keep the government￿ s
budget constraint balanced at every moment
￿rtrtkt + ￿wtwthtut + Tt = stwt (1 ￿ ut ￿ lt)ht: (16)
2.5 Competitive Equilibrium



































































t=0 solve the ￿rm problem.
(iii) The average human capital hCE
at is equal to hCE
t at each period t.
(iv) The government budget is balanced in every period.
(v) All markets clear.
6
8Therefore, when we consider a decentralized economy, equilibrium allocations, prices
and policies have to satisfy equation (4) and equations (6) to (13) from the household
problem, equations (1) to (3) from the ￿rm￿ s problem, the government budget constraint
(16) and an additional expression equating ht and hat.
2.6 Social Planner Problem
In this section we present the centralized economy. We assume that a social planner
who internalizes the externality of human capital allocates resources and time so as to
maximize lifetime utility. There will be two constraints in the planner￿ s problem: one
characterizing the human capital production technology, equation (4), and the so called
resource constraint,
ct + kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿k)kt ￿ h
￿
tF (kt;utht): (17)
























































































































+ 1 ￿ ￿h
￿
: (22)
Since the planner takes into account the impact of average human capital in the
production technology, she will ￿nd optimal to devote more time to schooling than in a
competitive equilibrium with no public intervention.
As in the competitive equilibrium case, we can substitute ￿rst order conditions (18)
and (19) into equations (20) and (21) to get the intertemporal and intratemporal ￿rst
7





























































The two equations above show that in the ￿rst best allocation, there is no wedge
neither between the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption and the
gross return on capital nor between the marginal rate of substitution between leisure
and consumption and the marginal product of labor. As we will see in the next section,
any policy designed to decentralize the ￿rst best should not lead to any wedge between
marginal rates of substitution and marginal rates of transformation.
2.7 Multiplicity of equilibria and policy
Due to the aggregate increasing returns in the production technology and leisure in the
utility, there might exist a unique path towards a unique balanced growth path, or arise
a continuum of transition paths or multiple balanced growth paths for some sets of pa-
rameters, as discussed for example in Benhabib and Perli (1994) or Ladr￿n-de-Guevara
et al. (1997). This means that the optimal education policy should react to the actual
choice of consumption and time allocation between di⁄erent activities at each moment
of time. Two countries with similar initial conditions but di⁄erent choices of endogenous
variables might require di⁄erent government action to reach the optimum.
3 Optimal policy
This section studies the ￿scal policy that allows to decentralize the ￿rst best allocation,
that is, the policy that will lead to a competitive equilibrium with allocations, prices and
welfare as those chosen by the central planner. We prove that when households derive
utility from leisure, lump sum taxation cannot be avoided in the design of the optimal
policy.
We ￿rst study how to set taxes on capital and labor income to reach the ￿rst best
outcome. The ￿rst proposition shows that both types of taxation should be left out of
the optimal system.
8
10Proposition 1 The optimal ￿scal policy that decentralizes the ￿rst best allocation should
set capital income and labor income taxes equal to zero.
Proof. We build the optimal policy by comparing the system of equations that char-
acterize a competitive equilibrium to the set that results from the planner￿ s problem. The
optimal tax policy is such that both systems imply the same constraints on the endoge-
nous variables of the model. We prove that ￿wt = ￿rt = 0 is a necessary condition for
the optimal policy to implement the ￿rst best allocation by comparing the intratemporal
and the intertemporal ￿rst order conditions in the competitive equilibrium and in the


































































Setting both tax rates to zero, these two conditions become equal to (23) and (24).
The optimal policy implements the optimal wedge between marginal rates of sub-
stitution and marginal rates of transformation. Ruling out capital taxation results in
a competitive equilibrium with undistorted intertemporal consumption/savings decisions
as in the social planner outcome. On the other hand, labor income taxes increase the
relative price of leisure and lead to a non-optimal allocation of consumption and leisure
time. The ￿rst best can only be reached by setting distorting labor taxes equal to zero.
Proposition 1 discards capital and labor income taxes. Hence, if there were a subsidy
policy to decentralize the ￿rst best, those subsidies should be funded through lump sum
taxes. The following proposition characterizes the dynamics of the optimal subsidy policy
and the funding by lump sum taxation.
Proposition 2 The ￿rst best allocation is decentralized through a policy consisting in
subsidies that are proportional to foregone earnings while studying. The subsidy rate
evolves according to
(1 ￿ ￿h)st+1 = a
SP




































Revenues to fund the subsidy are collected through lump sum taxes.
Proof. We follow the same strategy as in the previous proposition. We will compare
the equilibrium conditions of the social planner￿ s problem and the competitive equilibrium.
Substituting (8) into (11) and using (9) we obtain the ￿rst order condition on human
capital in terms of marginal utility of leisure. Substituting for wages and interest rates



































￿ (1 ￿ ￿h)
#
(30)
for the competitive solution. Analogously for the social planner problem, using (19), (20)







































+ 1 ￿ ￿h: (31)




























Using the result from Proposition 1, setting the tax on labor income ￿wt = ￿wt+1 = 0, we
obtain (27).
We can easily prove that the resource constraint (17) holds in a competitive equilibrium
when the agent￿ s budget constraint (6), the government budget constraint (16) and the
￿rm￿ s problem ￿rst order conditions (2)-(3) are satis￿ed. Finally, since all other taxes
introduce distortions and are, therefore, left out of the optimal policy scheme, the funding
of optimal subsidies should rely on lump sum taxes.
If we restrict the production function to a Cobb-Douglas functional form, we get
a model economy for which the ￿rst best can be decentralized through subsidies that
depend on time allocated to the production of goods and to leisure. These subsidies will
be constant in the balanced growth path. The following proposition presents formally the
characterization of the optimal policy for this production function.
Proposition 3 When we assume a Cobb-Douglas functional form for the production
technology, i.e. F (kt;utht) = Ak￿
t (utht)1￿￿, where A is the technology parameter and
10
120 < ￿ < 1 is the share of physical capital in output, the law of motion of the optimal






















Moreover, for the family of functional forms for the utility function consistent with a




￿uSP￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ lSP￿)
: (34)
where uSP￿ and lSP￿ are time allocated to work and leisure in the balanced growth path,
respectively.





stituting into (28) and (29) we get (32) and (33). On a balanced growth path the
fraction of the time endowment devoted to work and leisure activities remain constant,
ut = ut+1 = u￿ and lt = lt+1 = l￿. The subsidy that implements the ￿rst best is also
constant. So when st = st+1 = s￿ for any period t; (27) implies (34).








t=0 necessary to compute aSP
t+1 and bSP
t+1 in
the dynamic equation (27) are given by the solution to the social planner problem. For a










































When the subsidy rate on the balanced growth path is known, limt!1 st+1 = s￿ (as given
in the equation (34) in Proposition 3), the initial value to be given to the subsidy rate



























13In order to obtain the optimal path for subsidies fstg1
t=0; we then use (27).
For the sake of simplicity, we do not include consumption taxes in the model econ-
omy￿ s tax system. The ￿rst best policy is not unique under a complete tax system with
consumption, labor income and capital income taxes. On one hand, consumption taxes
would increase the price of the consumption good and therefore distort the intratemporal
￿rst order condition. Optimal consumption taxes and labor income taxes should be of
equal size and opposite sign to attain the optimal wedge mentioned above. On the other
hand, time varying consumption taxes would distort the intertemporal consumption deci-
sion. Under the ￿rst best policy, capital income tax and the growth rate of consumption
tax should be related in a way that the intertemporal condition in the social planner￿ s
problem is undistorted. In any case, the capital income tax should converge to zero in the
long run, and consequently the consumption tax rate should converge to a constant. Chari
and Kehoe (1999) discuss alternative policies that decentralize the ￿rst best allocation
under di⁄erent theoretical setups.
We ￿nd a unique closed-form solution for the optimal policy when we assume Cobb-
Douglas production function, logarithmic preferences and full depreciation of physical and
human capital. The following proposition presents the result.
Proposition 4 When we assume a Cobb-Douglas functional form for the production tech-
nology, i:e: F (kt;utht) = Ak￿
t (utht)1￿￿, a logarithmic utility, i.e. U (ct;lt) = lnct+blnlt;
where b is the preference parameter, and total depreciation of both capitals, i.e. ￿k = ￿h =





(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)







b(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
b(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)
(38)
and the government will achieve the optimal allocations by subsidizing the foregone earn-
ings at the rate
st = s =
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿
:


















































Using (42), equating the growth rate of human capital from (4) with the growth rate
of shadow price of human capital obtained from (22) and (19) we get the expression for










Combining (37) and (43) we get the expression for the time devoted to leisure, equa-
tion (38). To obtain the optimal subsidy we substitute the expressions for the working
and leisure time into (32), (33) and (35). The lump sum transfer is obtained from the
government budget constraint, equation (16).
154 Conclusions
In this study we extend G￿mez (2003) by introducing leisure into the utility function. If
one allows for lump sum taxes in a model of Gomez (2003), where the utility is derived
only from consumption, the optimal solution can be obtained via an in￿nite number of
combinations of labor income tax, subsidy to foregone earnings while studying and lump
sum tax which balances the government budget. However, we ￿nd that only one such
solution can be applied when both consumption and leisure are valued by households.
Namely, to arrive at the optimal solution in a model with consumption and leisure in the
utility function, the subsidy to forgone earnings should be ￿nanced through a lump sum
fee and labor income taxes should be avoided.
The di⁄erences in the results are caused by the fact that the optimizing government in
our economy should act as a choice architect for both the households￿working and leisure
time, whereas a government with the same objectives as in G￿mez (2003) only targets
the choice of agents￿working time. A positive labor income tax increases the relative
price of consumption and would make agents substitute consumption with leisure. This
distortion can only be avoided with zero labor taxes. Subsidies to foregone earnings alone
give the correct incentives as they make people go more to school and cut both on leisure
and working times.
As proved in other papers, there might be multiple equilibrium paths in this model
economy. So, our analysis implies that the optimal level of lump sum taxes and subsidies
should react to the choices of labor supply and leisure time which may di⁄er even if
countries face similar characteristics and initial conditions. Thus an optimal government
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